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Abstract 
Since the time Nietzsche declared the death of God, while Auguste Comte 
postulated in the Law of Three Stages that humankind had gone pass the 
religious/mythical stage as well as the metaphysical/speculative stage and was 
now living in the positive/scientific stage, there has been the consistent 
institutionalization of atheism and secularism. The early part of the 20th century 
saw Freud’s publication of the Future of an Illusion in which he predicted that 
as science continues to advance, religion will become obsolete. The logical 
positivist too lumped up metaphysical and religious propositions as meaningless 
and nonsensical. It is within this atmosphere that Alfred North Whitehead 
comes into philosophy. The main question that this paper seeks to answer is: 
Why does the concept of God occupy an eminent place in Whitehead’s system 
when all his contemporaries consider God a hypothesis they no longer needed 
as Laplace had earlier maintained? Of great interest here is the fact that before 
1925 Whitehead’s writings had no concern for God. However, in his 1925 
Science and the Modern World, the chapter on “Abstractions” required that 
there be such an explanatory factor, reason for which it is immediately followed 
by the chapter on “God”. The last part of his Process and Reality treats 
elaborately the nature of the relationship between God and the world. This paper 
explores the reasons why Whitehead places a lot of interest on God and the role 
that this God plays in his system.  
Key Words: God, Creativity, atheism, post-deistic, Process 
Metaphysics, aesthetics 
I. Introduction 
In his African Religions and Philosophy, Mbitti (1969: p. 1) holds that 
“Africans are notoriously religious.” These words paint the picture of Africa 
flourishing with ancient religious traditions and rituals, with Islam dominating 
huge areas of the African continent, with Christians in their first fervor filling 
churches to overflowing, and with new religious movements proliferating 
everywhere (Aylward & Onyancha 1997). As such, cultural values revolve 
around religious beliefs and the concept of God, reason why most of the norms  
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and laws are acceptable to the people. Igboin (2011: p. 96) argues that it “is a 
fact that in African traditional belief, God is the explanation of all things. The 
world was created by him. The Africans therefore believe that the environment 
is knitted to the presence of God.” For Mbiti (1969: p. 119), “God is the 
explanation of man’s origin and sustenance; it is as if God exists for the sake of 
man.” God’s agents are charged with the responsibility of maintaining law and 
order in the society. Thus, both physical and supernatural forces are always 
present in the administration of the society (Igboin 2011). 
This concept of God is, therefore, vital to the worldview of the traditional 
African since God permeates every facet of the African universe. This was the 
case in the western worldview before the advent of secularism. When we page 
through the history of philosophy we realise that metaphysical investigations of 
God have preoccupied Western philosophers from Aristotle through Plotinus to 
St Augustine, St Anselm, St Thomas Aquinas, Don Scotus, Descartes, and 
others, who have provided a plurality of arguments to prove the existence of an 
Absolute Being.  
From the Enlightenment, religion started losing taste among Western thinkers, 
here we think of Hume, Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche, Freud and others. This 
led to the rise and proliferation of secularism as McTernan explains: 
The ‘secularization thesis’ that dominates contemporary Western political 
thinking is based on the premises that the decline in religion is an irreversible 
process. The enlightenment, the secularists argue, challenged the old religious 
certainties, making science the new paradigm of understanding the world. 
Religion  lingers on as a comforting  myth  for  those  who  need  support  in 
times of personal crisis but having been relegated from the mainstream to the 
backwaters it has ceased to have any impact on the social  or  political  life  in  
modern  society. Religion  therefore  is  seen  as  an   ‘epiphenomenon’  -  it  
represents  something  other than what  it  appears  to  be  – and  as  such, they 
maintain, it has no real role in shaping a new international order (McTernan 
2008: pp. 12-13). 
Within such an atmosphere, religion is seen to be clung to only by those who 
cannot see the arguments against it or are so clever that they can make up 
apparently true, but in reality false, arguments for why they continue to believe 
(Habgood 1972). This attitude towards religion means that God no longer 
needed in the western society. Ludwig Feuerbach expresses it thus: 
In place of the love of God, we ought to acknowledge the love of man as the only 
true religion. In place of belief in God, we ought to expand man’s belief in 
himself, in his own strength; the belief that humanity’s destiny is dependent not 
on a being higher than humanity itself, that man’s only demon is man himself – 
the primitive man, superstitious, egoistic evil, but that similarly man’s only God 
is man himself (Feuerbach 1957: p. 31). 
The 20th century exemplifies the greatest attempt to displace God from all 
human activities. It stands out as the most secularized, with the highest number 
of openly proclaimed atheists. It is within this 20th century scientific atmosphere 
that Alfred North Whitehead gets into philosophy. Unlike his contemporaries,  
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he devoted much of his philosophical life to science, metaphysics and religion 
and considered these to be very much interconnected and dynamic disciplines 
that are linked by constant interactions leading to the emergence of a global 
vision of reality. It is only when all are taken as working together, albeit, 
maintaining their autonomy, that one can arrive at the truth. Hence the 
fundamental question that this paper seeks to answer: Why does God occupy 
an eminent place in Whitehead’s system? This is especially interesting because 
Whitehead’s contemporaries (the Logical Positivists) had classified 
metaphysical and religious propositions as meaningless and nonsensical. God 
was dead and science, with its verifiability principle, was the only instrument 
that could ascertain validity. To further compound the issue, Whitehead himself 
had been dissatisfied with thinkers who required God as a solution to the 
problems in the natural world. In fact, for him, “the easy assumption that there 
is an ultimate reality which, in some unexplained way, is to be appealed to for 
the removal of the perplexity, constitutes the great refusal of rationality to assert 
its rights” (Whitehead 1926: pp. 134-135). Yet, in his 1925 Science and the 
Modern World, Whitehead invoked God as an explanatory principle in his 
philosophy. 
God is the most bewildering concept in Whitehead’s metaphysics. Whitehead’s 
process philosophy prioritizes becoming over being, relation over substance, 
and advocates for incessant novelty over the permanence. Whitehead argues 
against the bifurcation of nature or the separation of reality from appearance. 
His philosophy grants equal ontological status to every single thing that exists, 
insofar as it exists. And he calls existing realities, not beings, but actual entities. 
These are the “final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going 
behind actual entities to find anything more real. ... God is an actual entity and 
so is the most trivial puff of existence in far off empty space. The final facts 
are, all alike, actual entities” (Whitehead 1978: p. 18). Since Whitehead’s God 
is an actual entity like any other existing entity, there is no room for a specially 
“eminent” entity: one that would be absolute, unchanging, transcendent, and 
super-sensible, as God is usually taken to be. He himself admits this in the 
following words: 
The notion of God as the “unmoved mover” is derived from Aristotle, at least so 
far as Western thought is concerned. The notion of God as “eminently real” is a 
favourite doctrine of Christian theology. The combination of the two into the 
doctrine of an aboriginal, eminently real, transcendent creator, at whose fiat the 
world came into being, and whose imposed will it obeys, is the fallacy which has 
infused tragedy into the histories of Christianity and of Mahometanism 
(Whitehead 1978: p. 342). 
Whitehead recognized that human understanding is always constructed from 
some metaphysical framework. For him, “apart from metaphysical 
presupposition there can be no civilization” (Whitehead 1947: p. 164). 
Metaphysical understanding can guide one’s imagination and provide basis for 
one’s thought and action. Metaphysics, as a result, is a kind of spiritual 
innovation. Whitehead was also disturbed by the scientists who tried to prove,  
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with their science, the non-existence of God. Deeply concerned by this non-
religious current in philosophic thought, he sought to develop a philosophical 
system in which God and the findings of science would not be mutually 
exclusive or even inharmonious (Frost 1989: p. 266). With him, metaphysics 
regained its primordial position but this time not classical Aristotelian-
Thomistic metaphysics. He championed Process Metaphysics (from his critique 
of materialist mechanism) which views reality as one of change and process. 
All entities or events in the world possess processes and are contributing to a 
larger process, reality. Why does Whitehead need God in his metaphysical 
system? 
II. God in Whitehead’s Metaphysical System 
John B Cobb Jr. explains the necessity of Whitehead’s God from a historical 
perspective, that is, from the philosophical atmosphere at the beginning of 
modernism and its aftermath in these words: 
Modernity arose through a process of secularization. This was in part a 
continuation of the prophetic tradition within Christianity. In this tradition God 
is sharply distinguished from the world and the way things are. God's 
transcendence is emphasized. God judges the world. God's will calls for the 
transformation of the world. Thus the world as it is is not sacred. It is the creation 
of God but not itself divine. Human beings are free to explore it and to use it 
(Cobb 1994: p. 51) 
Earth was therefore the center of the universe and God dwelled in the outermost 
sphere. This was an appalling condition that Whitehead’s God was introduced 
to remedy and revolutionize. In fact, for Cobb, this horrendous situation was 
present in medieval Christianity along with more sacramental views that 
connected the divine and the natural more closely. God was the external creator 
of a machine whose workings reflected infinite knowledge and control. But the 
machine could be examined and adjusted without involving God in any way 
(Cobb 1994). As a consequence, God was isolated from human affairs 
especially issues of science. God was only known as the author of the moral law 
and as the one who will judge all depending on our obedience to this law. 
Religion had its place but one that was segregated from the natural sciences. In 
fact, the full development of modernism has had a negative effect on religion 
and the place of God. Cobb again articulates it succinctly when he says: 
The fuller development of modernism involved the extension of secular thought 
further and further. Society and morality, like nature, came to be understood as 
separate from God and thus freed from religion. The area in which religion had 
an appropriate role became smaller and smaller, and, for an increasing number 
of people, it vanished altogether. Whereas in early modernism it was generally 
supposed that a rational religion of some form is needed to maintain social 
order, in late modernism religion in general is typically seen as an oppressive 
and distorting force from which the human spirit needs to be freed (Cobb 1994: 
p. 52). 
God was, therefore, considered a substitute for and a competitor with science. 
Yet for Whitehead, God is neither a substitute nor a competitor. Rather he is the  
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primordial ground of reality. He is not before all creation but with all creation. 
In fact, God, for Whitehead, is a fellow sufferer who understands and preserves 
everything with tender kindness that nothing be lost (Whitehead 1978: p. 342). 
For this reason God cannot be far removed from the world for that would lead 
to a vicious separation of God and the world. This explains Whitehead’s 
insistence on the immanence of God.  
But this immanent God is not static but is in process with all of reality. This is 
because, for God to be related to the world and to be meaningful to it, He must 
in some way interact with it. God is the reason for the whole movement of 
process and evolution of the world. So important is He to the universe that 
without Him the universe becomes meaningless. This falls in line with 
Whitehead’s principle of process: that the actual world is a process, and that the 
process is the becoming of actual entities. The being of an actual entity is 
constituted by its becoming (Whitehead 1978: p. 23). To be is to be in process, 
and this, to Whitehead, is fundamental and so to say that God stands outside his 
principle is to deny His existence. This is what he means when he says that 
“neither God, nor the world, reaches static completion. Both are in the grip of 
the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty” 
(Whitehead 1978: p. 349). This principle of process clearly shows Whitehead’s 
abandonment of the traditional understanding of substance with its inhering 
qualities. Whitehead demonstrates by this principle that the category of 
becoming is more inclusive than that of being, for even becoming includes 
being, whereas being excludes becoming or even out-rightly denies it any 
ontological status. Traditionally the category of being has been understood as 
singularly static and the unchanging subject of change is considered as 
substance. In its place Whitehead thinks that, if entities are thought of in terms 
of fluency or process, then becoming is the category that most aptly applies to 
reality (Farr 2005). 
Whitehead (1978) considers metaphysics to be the study of the generic traits of 
nature in all its aspects. Metaphysics, as such, tries to establish a scheme 
capable of interpreting any and all of experience. More specifically, 
metaphysics, for Whitehead, is “the science which seeks to discover the general 
ideas which are indispensably relevant to the analysis of everything that 
happens” (Whitehead 1930: p. 84). The notion of “everything that happens” is 
important because for Whitehead, reality is made up of events – actual 
occasions – and not static substances. As such, all things flow. This, for 
Whitehead, is the most fundamental fact of experience. That’s why Whitehead 
considers the flux of things as the one “ultimate generalization around which 
we must weave our philosophy” and as such “the elucidation of meaning in the 
phrase ‘all things flow’ is one chief task of metaphysics” (Whitehead 1978: p. 
208). 
Why, then, introduce in this the real presence of a divine being? For Charles 
Hartshorne, the answer is twofold: First Whitehead is not without religion. 
Second, his categories adopted at least as much for the other purposes require 
God as their chief and indispensable exemplification (Hartshorne 1972). In his  
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 “Whitehead Without God” Donald Sherburne provides three reasons for the 
presence of God in Whitehead’s metaphysical scheme: (1) God preserves the 
past and in so doing creates significance, meaningfulness, and also provides the 
ontological ground for the claim that truth is immortal; (2) God provides the 
ontological ground, the “somewhere,” for eternal objects; (3) God is the source 
of subjective aims in temporal occasions, and in this role is the principle of 
limitation productive of order, the source of novelty, and the source of the real 
perspective standpoint within the extensive continuum for each occasion 
(Sherburne 1967). 
Following the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition of presenting arguments to 
justify the introduction of the divine being in their systems, we shall present 
Whitehead’s attempt at arguing for the necessity an Absolute in his 
metaphysical system.  
III.  God as a Harmonizing Factor in Whitehead’s Metaphysics 
For Whitehead, “God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical 
principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification” 
(Whitehead 1978: p. 344). God, for Whitehead, is an essential element that 
could not be substituted in the coherence of his metaphysical image of the 
physical world. He does not try to religiously apply the concept of God, but 
rather presents it as a coherent metaphysical element of the universe (Monserrat 
2008). Without God, the coherence of the basic metaphysics cannot be 
maintained. As God was necessary for the Aristotelian system, Whitehead 
considered that is was necessary for his metaphysics as well. This is because 
nothing within any limited type of experience can give intelligence to shape our 
ideas of any entity at the base of all actual things, unless the general character 
of things requires that there be such an entity. Hence, “in the place of Aristotle’s 
God as Prime Mover, we require God as the Principle of Concretion” 
(Whitehead 1926: p. 174).  
Therefore, from Whitehead’s Ontological Principle which establishes actual 
entities as the basic unit of existence, Whitehead argues that these entities, 
though they are the final real things of the which the world is made, they are 
themselves limited, for the creative advancement into novelty surpasses their 
simply moving from one entity to a new entity. The universe is in a process of 
becoming, the creative advance into novelty. The becoming of new things 
implies that there are unrealized possibilities which are really achievable. From 
the ontological principle, actuality is prior to possibility in that something is 
before it becomes. Now, the unrealized possibilities are realized thanks to the 
ingression of eternal objects into actual entities. It follows that the grounding 
of temporally unrealized possibilities must be in a non-temporal entity, God, 
and in this case in His Primordial nature. In Whitehead’s words: 
The things which are temporal arise by their participation in the things which 
are eternal. The two sets are mediated by a thing which combines the actuality 
of what is temporal with the timelessness of what is potential. This final entity is 
the divine element in the world…. By reason of the actuality of this primordial  
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valuation of pure potentials, each eternal object has a definite, effective 
relevance to each concrescent process. Apart from such ordering, there would 
be a complete disjunction of eternal objects unrealized in the temporal world. 
Novelty would be meaningless, and inconceivable (Whitehead 1978: p. 40). 
As such Monserrat explains that in the continuous process of the “general 
potentiality of the universe”, its creative advancement into novelty is 
explainable only to the extent that we found it on some “special non-temporal 
actual entity that is always given as the ontological base of the universe. This 
is what Whitehead calls God.” Now, since out of nothing comes nothing (ex 
nihilo nihil fit), God thus acts as that “fundamental actual entity that gives birth 
to the (ontological) potentiality of the universal process” (Monserrat 2008: p. 
832). 
Furthermore, for Whitehead’s eternal objects as the pure potentialities 
responsible for the transit from potentiality to actuality, that is, from old to new 
actual entities, to make sense, there must be an ordering principle and this can 
neither be actual entities themselves nor eternal objects. Whitehead describes 
eternal objects as “the realm of ideal entities, or forms, which are in themselves 
not actual, but are such that they are exemplified in everything that is actual, 
according to some proportion of relevance” (Whitehead 1925: p. 24).  That’s 
why an eternal object can be described only in terms of its potentiality for 
‘ingression’ into the becoming of actual entities. The term ‘ingression’ refers 
to the particular mode in which the potentiality of an eternal object is realized 
in a particular actual entity, contributing to the definiteness of that actual entity 
(Whitehead 1978: p. 24).  The selection and rejection of eternal objects is the 
done only by each actual entity since eternal objects are simply pure potentials. 
Hence, “an eternal object is always a potentiality for actual entities; but in itself, 
as conceptually felt, it is neutral as to the fact of its physical ingression in any 
particular actual entity of the temporal world” (Whitehead 1978: p. 44). God 
must exist without which eternal objects would be “mere undifferentiated 
nonentities, mere isolation indistinguishable from nonentities” (Whitehead 
1978: p. 392) since eternal objects, by themselves, are not properly ordered for 
ingression into this or that actual entity. The primordial nature therefore 
establishes relevance between eternal objects and actual entities: 
‘Relevance’ must express some real fact of togetherness among forms. The 
ontological principle can be expressed as: All real togetherness is togetherness 
in the formal constitution of an actuality. So if there be a relevance of what in 
the temporal world is unrealised, the relevance must express a fact of 
togetherness in the formal constitution of a non-temporal actuality. But by the 
principle of relativity there can only be one non-derivative actuality, unbounded 
by its prehensions of an actual world. Such a primordial superject of creativity 
achieves, in its unity of satisfaction, the complete conceptual valuation of eternal 
objects on which the creative order depends…. Its status as an actual efficient 
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Monserrat is even more explicit in this light when stating the necessity of God 
from the point of eternal objects:  
These (eternal objects) are by nature of their pure potentiality, abstract forms 
without realization and without relation to actual entities; above all if we pay 
attention to their most germinal and primogenital forms. Nonetheless, eternal 
objects have been made by way of an evolutionary process: how could they then 
have entered into the creative process of actual entities? Whitehead responds to 
that by saying God is precisely the   mediation   between   the   potential   (eternal   
objects)   and   the   actual   (its actualization in the world as a concrescent 
process). The existence of God as the ontological basis of the world therefore 
explains that the eternal objects have in God, as an eternal actual entity, an 
ideal, representative conceptual actuality. God is the guide of the realization of 
the «eternal objects» (formal) in the concrescence of the actual entities 
(Monserrat 2008: p. 832). 
As such, God evokes new subjects into being and preserves their achievements 
and thus is both the source and conserver of all finite values. Eternal objects are 
ordered by God with a view to eliciting greater value in the world. Actual 
occasions prehend pure potentials for their realization as ordered in his way. 
Thus they derive from God an initial aim at realizing what is possible in that 
situation. Hence God’s necessity lies in the fact that His ordering of eternal 
objects functions as a basis of regularity in the world, the basis of novelty and 
of purposiveness (Cobb 2008: p. 68).  
God is, therefore, necessary as the ground of novelty. Here the question is: why 
do new kinds of things come into existence rather than merely repeat the 
patterns of their predecessors? (Barbour 1996). Whitehead’s answer is that 
apart from God there is nothing new in the world, and no order in the world. 
But even more important is the fact that the presence of God’s “conceptual 
feelings” (Primordial nature) as “data” for all actual occasions (Whitehead 
1978) is the reason why there is never just mere repetition. In every 
concrescence, “physical inheritance is essentially accompanied by a conceptual 
reaction partly conformed to it, and partly introductory of a relevant novel 
contrast, but always introducing emphasis, valuation, and purpose” (Whitehead 
1978: p. 108). God is the source of such a “conceptual reaction” involving 
“contrast”; he provides the alternatives that allow the entity to make its own 
“decision.”  This is why Whitehead proclaims, in several passages in his 
Process and Reality, that “apart from God, there could be no relevant novelty” 
(Whitehead 1978: p. 164); that “God is the organ of novelty, aiming at 
intensification” (Whitehead 1978: p. 67); that, “apart from such orderings” of 
eternal objects as occur in the primordial nature of God, “novelty would be 
meaningless, and inconceivable” (Whitehead 1978: p. 40) and that “apart from 
the intervention of God, there could be nothing new in the world” (Whitehead 
1978: p. 247). Steven Shaviro further explains that Whitehead’s: 
God is a force for novelty, precisely because he does not determine the actual 
course of events. To the contrary, he ensures the indeterminacy of this course, 
its openness to difference in the future.  God does not decide anything; but he  
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offers material for the decisions made by all other entities. Whitehead’s God is 
therefore an anti-entropic force; without him, “the course of creation would be 
a dead level of ineffectiveness, with all balance and intensity progressively 
excluded by the cross currents of incompatibility” (Process and Reality, 247). 
God renovates the universe by making incompossibles compatible. In case of 
contradiction or exclusion, he “converts the opposition into a contrast” (Process 
and Reality 348), so that formerly irreconcilable terms become thinkable and 
realizable together. Whitehead’s God may not quite embody the category of 
community (reciprocal determination) in the way that Kant’s does; but at least 
he widens the scope of such community. God is the reason why mere linear 
causality (the “causal efficacy” of “physical inheritance”) cannot completely 
determine (although, of course, it very strongly constrains) the course of events 
(Shaviro 2009: p. 134). 
Even more, God is a stimulus for change: in Whitehead’s most striking phrase, 
he is “the goad towards novelty” (Whitehead 1978: p. 88). God provides the 
“lure for feeling” that seduces an entity into its process of becoming, or that 
draws it into difference  
Finally, Whitehead needed God in his system as the fundamental explanatory 
factor. The world of actual entities is insufficient to explain what they have 
produced by themselves in the process of concrescence in the history of the 
universe. They are insufficient and need to have reference to a fundamental 
basis, understood to be God, which contains, representatively, the universe of 
formal possibilities (mental pole) and ontologically, the universe of the physical 
possibilities of concrescence in the enriching evolution of the universe 
(physical pole). Therefore Whitehead thinks in a similar way to traditional 
theist philosophy: the world is insufficient to give reason to itself and it is 
necessary to postulate the existence of God as the basis of being. To 
metaphysically conceive of the world and go toward its ultimate fundamental 
roots, we arrive at the ultimate limitation, which is God. There is nothing 
beyond that limit; it is the last thing, ontologically stable and without time 
which confers to the world a basis. This basis, God, is the beginning of 
determination and the concrete nature of nature but is not in itself derived from 
anything. It is “the last” in the sense that it is necessary to postulate 
metaphysically of an entity that is the basis for and determines unstable events 
without itself being founded or determined. We refer to God as being necessary; 
as the necessary principle to base the world (the real and the formal). 
Nevertheless, at the same time, God is not possible as a rational explanatory 
object. This is because Whitehead tells us in a slightly cryptic way:  
God is the ultimate limitation, and His existence is the ultimate irrationality. For, 
no reason can be given for just that limitation which it stands in His nature to 
impose. God is not concrete, but He is the ground for concrete actuality. No 
reason can be given for the nature of God, because that nature is the ground of 
rationality (Whitehead 1978: p. 179). 
How are we, then, to understand what divine irrationality really means? For 
Roth (1967: p. 126), this simply means that “though there is a metaphysical  
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need for a principle of determination, there is no final explanation of the 
principle itself.” Monserrat’s interpretation is as follows: 
The world, in the previous sense, is not self-sufficient or absolute: it must be 
based on an entity that is neither concrete or determinable from a subsequent 
dimension: it must be the last, the ontological basis, sufficient and non-temporal: 
we can infer that it is the basis and we can attribute to it necessity (the necessary 
permanence in being once we know that it exists). However, this entity that is the 
basis for the rationality of the world is not, in turn by itself rational because we 
cannot explain it. We know that God exists but not how or why. We cannot speak 
rationally about the ultimate limit. We cannot say, for example, that God is that 
whose essence is to necessarily exist; we do not know what God is like or what 
its essence is. The world, for Whitehead tells us that God should exist and as the 
basis for being we consider it necessary (Monserrat 2008: p. 834). 
 Alix Parmentier argues in this regard that Whitehead affirms the need for 
human intelligence to be guided, to establish the existence of God yet he argues 
too for the impossibility to find a way to form a concept (of God). We can 
“metaphysically discover that God exists (and this is the ultimate requirement 
of human intelligence and its grandeur) but we cannot know what it is” 
(Parmentier 1968: p. 491). He also observes that to put God as the beginning of 
necessary determination does not imply that we should give him a “reason”: it 
is the ultimate limitation, that it is not possible to give a reason it escapes all 
rationality that is on top of it and is able to explain it. From there, “God does 
not allow itself to be deduced” (Parmentier 1968: p. 492) and it is the ultimate 
irrationality that is necessary in order to confer rationality to the world. Thus 
without God Whitehead’s metaphysical categories would fail since eternal 
objects and actual occasions dearly need such a being.  
IV. The Aesthetic Function of Whitehead’s god 
Whitehead’s God plays an aesthetic role in the evolution of the universe. For 
him, the aim of God is beauty. God is the measure of the aesthetic consistency 
of the world. God is the lure for feeling which draws actual occasions towards 
new heights of creative beauty. God is the primordial ground of order and 
novelty of actual occasions. He is both the measure of their past successes and 
their spur to new ones. Thus:  
God’s role is not the combat of productive force with productive force, or of 
destructive force with destructive force; it lies in the patient operation of the 
overpowering rationality of his conceptual harmonisation. He does not create 
the world, he saves it: or more accurately, he is the poet of the world, with tender 
patience leading it by his vision of truth, beauty and goodness (Whitehead 1978: 
p. 346). 
Whitehead posits God on the basis of “aesthetic experience,” rather than 
morality. To the extent that we make “decisions” – and, for Whitehead, decision 
“constitutes the very meaning of actuality” (Whitehead 1978: p. 43) – we are 
engaged in a process of selection. We “feel” (or positively prehend) certain 
data, and “eliminate from feeling” (or negatively prehend) certain others. But  
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this process of selection is an aesthetic one. It is felt, rather than thought (or felt 
before it is thought); and it is freely chosen, rather than being obligatory. The 
process of selection rests upon aesthetic criteria, rather than upon either 
cognitive or moral ones. These criteria are what Whitehead calls the Categorial 
Obligations of “Subjective Harmony” and “Subjective Intensity” (Whitehead 
1978: p. 27). The subjective aim of every actual occasion is first, to harmonize 
all its data, by making them compatible for integration into one complex fully 
determinate feeling and second, to maximize the intensity of this feeling. The 
goal of every decision is therefore Beauty, defined by Whitehead as the mutual 
adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of experience. As for the 
intensity with which this “adaptation” is felt, Whitehead simply notes that “an 
intense experience is an aesthetic fact” (Whitehead 1978: p. 277). 
V. Conclusion 
Whitehead’s philosophizing on God at the time when his student – Bertrand 
Russell – and his contemporaries chose to either have a sceptical attitude 
towards such a subject or to out rightly reject and relegate such a subject to the 
sphere of the irrational, shows his commitment to the metaphysical quest. This 
is because, one cannot be genuinely metaphysical without arriving at the notion 
of an Absolute Being at the helm of the hierarchy of being. Granted Whitehead 
does not grant any special ontological status to God, since to him, all existents, 
including God are actual entities, he, however, grants a gradation in terms of 
function. Just as Aristotle and other great metaphysicians needed God as the 
terminus ad quem of their metaphysical expedition, Whitehead too followed in 
that trajectory. The difference is that Whitehead’s context was so hostile to any 
metaphysical and religious propositions, whereas earlier centuries had 
accommodated and even regarded such propositions as the basis of both lived 
experience and intellectual investigations. Another difference is that Whitehead 
chose a completely different form of metaphysics and as such, a completely 
different approach to theorizing about God. 
 Whitehead’s philosophy of mathematics is seen as an a priori investigation, 
focusing on what can be extracted from the knower. This, of course, is because 
mathematics is a rational science. His philosophy of nature is seen as a 
posterior because it focuses on what can be extracted from the known, that is, 
from nature. Now, Whitehead’s metaphysics is a synthesis of both the a priori 
and a posterior. This is what makes Whitehead’s thought to go deeper than his 
contemporaries. As such, Whitehead constructs the figure of God for reasons 
that lie deep in his metaphysics. Like Aristotle, Whitehead is forced to move in 
this direction because “the general character of things requires that there be 
such an entity” (Whitehead 1926: p. 174). When Whitehead figures God as a 
process, and as an empirical being rather than a transcendent one, this means 
that God cannot be cited as an excuse, or invoked as an ultimate fall-back 
explanation. No reason can be given for the nature of God because that nature 
is the ground of rationality. That is to say, the ground is itself groundless and 
non-rational; it is even the ultimate irrationality. Whitehead’s God helps to  
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make things happen (in his primordial nature); and he contemplates and 
preserves everything that has happened (in his consequent nature). But God 
cannot be used in order to explain or justify anything. In his quest to secularize 
the notion of God, Whitehead, like Kant, moves from a speculative stance to a 
practical one. Whitehead makes this point explicitly when he says that his own 
“line of thought” in regard to God   
extends  Kant’s  argument. He (Kant) saw the necessity for God in the moral 
order. But with his metaphysics he rejected the argument from the cosmos. The 
metaphysical doctrine, here expounded, finds the foundations of the world in the 
aesthetic experience, rather than – as with Kant – in the cognitive and conceptive 
experience All order is therefore aesthetic order, and the moral order is merely 
certain aspects of aesthetic order. The actual world is the outcome of the 
aesthetic order, and the aesthetic order is derived from the immanence of God 
(Whitehead 1925: p. 29). 
Whitehead saw the necessity for God in the modern world despite the great 
advances in technology. Each of us is still born and dies; each is still, 
throughout life, subject to accidental death or grievous injury and are still but a 
negligibly small part of a stupendous whole, which for all we know infinitely 
precedes and will infinitely outlast us. Though armed with atomic and nuclear 
power, humanity is yet almost nothing in physical power compared even to the 
sun. In fact, the devastating effects of global warming, nuclear radiations, 
natural disasters such earthquakes, tornadoes and cyclones, are a proof that 
science and technology are not they whole answer to man’s problems. With 
them, man still remains man and not God. If by eating the fruit, Adam and Eve 
thought they would be like God, with science and technology modern man 
thinks himself God – but all are doom to fail. On this earth now, we are 
powerful, but what are we in the vastness of reality? So close to nothing we can 
scarcely say how small, or how weak. However, science is one of our noblest, 
most glorious accomplishments. But one of the chief origins of science is deep 
humility. We are the only terrestrial animal who can see ourselves as but an 
item in the scheme of things, not the center about which all must or can be made 
to turn. We are not God and are infinitely far from being so. Rather we are tiny, 
and for all practical purposes ultimately temporary, as well as unreliable and 
often very cruel, creatures. 
With Hippolyte Ngimbi Nseka we believe that human beings being finite must 
have their foundation on something infinite, something absolute. Whitehead’s 
rejection of a wholly transcendent God poses problems even in our relations as 
human beings. Man is in need of an absolute that is transcendent and that he 
can look up to. In his book Dieu A L’Horizon De L’Acte Philosophique Ngimbi 
focuses his attention just like Whitehead on the problem of God but Ngimbi 
differs in that he favours very much the necessity of an Absolute and shows that 
the African, though notoriously religious and having several absolutes – 
ancestors, spirits etc – has that conception of a Necessary and Unique Absolute 
that gives a sense of direction to his life (Ngimbi 2002). But of what importance 
is this consciousness of the Absolute for the African? Ngimbi avers that in the  
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heart of his finite being – tended towards finite actions and always contingent 
in this world – is written « un mouvement de dépassement, un mouvement de 
transcendance qui oblige l’homme a ne pas boucler sur soi et a se dépasser 
toujours. Mouvement de transcendance qui ouvre l’homme a un progrès 
continue, infini et qu’on n’a pas le droit d’arrêter au niveau simplement 
terrestre, horizontal » (Ngimbi 2002 : p. 204). This is because in his finite but 
free existence, man is open to all possibilities. Here we see a link with 
Whitehead whose actual entities are free and open to all possibilities that God’s 
primordial nature provides - through eternal objects. 
On the whole, Whitehead’s successful conceptualization on God stands as a 
challenge to those who think we live in a post deistic era. In fact, Whitehead 
can be seen as one of the pioneers of the movement for the return to metaphysics 
and to religious investigations, a call that has resounded in some circles during 
the 20th century and Jean-Louis Schlegel’s (2012) “Retours de Dieu à l'ére 
postmétaphysique” testifies to the fact that such investigations are still carried 
out in the 21st century. 
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